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Abstract
Why does the horror genre serve as a source of pleasure, given
its aim to induce fear in the audience? I examine two general
solutions to this phenomenon, referred to as the paradox of
horror, which differ based upon their position regarding the
possibility of deriving pleasure from fear. Each of the possible
solutions contains significant flaws. I argue that, by adjusting a
meta-theory originally proposed by Susan Feagin, it is possible
to craft a solution that addresses the paradox while preserving
the idea that, at times, fear can be enjoyed. The article
concludes by considering the moral status of macabre
fascination, which is often subject to recrimination. Given that
such fascination is a driving force behind the willingness to
engage with horror, does it follow that these works ought to be
viewed as morally problematic? Drawing upon the concept of a
moral saint, I argue the lack of macabre fascination is
problematic. Exercising this fascination is beneficial to the
development of character traits. Thus such indulgences are,
within reason, morally acceptable.
Key Words
ethics, horror, macabre, meta-response, pleasurable fear,
reactive attitudes

1. Introducing the paradox
The macabre is often regarded as a source of significant fear
and anxiety. Events and objects belonging to the macabre
contain elements of violence, decay, and, notably, death.
Typically, these are seen as undesirable, horrific, and
disturbing occurrences that one should avoid whenever
possible. Although seemingly straightforward, this brings to
light an intriguing question. If the macabre is viewed with such
trepidation, why is its artistic representation a popular source
of entertainment? Why seek out in the arts what are otherwise
terrifying, real-world occurrences, and how can we explain
such pleasurable fear? This phenomenon most clearly
manifests in our interaction with works of horror. A genre
designed around provoking fear, horror nonetheless enjoys a
sizable audience, and notable success.[1]
I consider horror art as delineated by Andrea Sauchelli, "a work
is a sample of art-horror if it is designed to evoke a specific Hmood using the artistic means peculiar to the form of art to
which it belongs…generally marked by a morbid attention
toward (principally) death, murder, and evil through the artistic
means appropriate to the specific art form.”[2] I will open by
examining prior solutions offered within the philosophical study
of horror, a juncture of aesthetics and philosophical psychology
that explores this phenomenon with the greatest depth.
I consider two distinct tactics utilized to dissolve this seeming
paradox. The first asserts that pleasure does not stem from the
sensation of fear but from a separate intellectual satisfaction.
The opposing viewpoint contests fear can be enjoyed, thus
negating any paradox. I propose that both fail to offer a wholly
comprehensive explanation, and will present an account of my
own design inspired by Susan Feagin's often-overlooked

account of horror.[3] If successful, this new account raises an
additional question regarding the moral status of macabre
fascination. Namely, is indulgence morally acceptable, given
that it is often met with recrimination? I argue indulging
macabre fascination is acceptable given its value in cultivating
vital character traits.
2. Fear as universally abhorrent
One method of addressing the paradox is to deny that fear can
serve as a source of pleasure. Noël Carroll offers perhaps the
most widely-known formulation of this account. He asserts
pleasure found through engaging with macabre works is not
due to fear. Such emotional states are intrinsically unpleasant,
and therefore impossible to enjoy.[4] Macabre fictional objects
are unnatural, as their existence implies a kind of categorical
violation. For example, Dracula is simultaneously alive and
dead.[5] This interstitial quality arouses fear, but also
transforms the object of horror into a source of curiosity, which
can only be sated by continued narrative engagement. It is this
revelation of details that causes pleasure, as it sates our
intrigue.[6] Fear is not enjoyed for its own sake. Rather, it is
the price to pay for the satisfaction of narrative curiosity.
Carroll's account, while valuable as a contribution to the
philosophy of horror, has faced many objections. It relies too
heavily upon satisfaction of narrative curiosity as the sole
source of pleasure from horror. Pleasurable fear can persist
even in the near or total absence of such curiosity. Carroll
maintains different horror fictions will contain enough variance
in subject matter or content to pique sufficient intrigue.[7]
However, this fails to explain how identical, or largely similar
works of horror can still produce pleasurable fear. Two such
specific instances come readily to mind. It is not uncommon for
an individual to engage with a narrative and, finding it
enjoyable, reengage with it at another time.[8] Furthermore,
doing so continues to produce pleasurable fear, for example,
making a tradition of watching Hellraiser every Halloween. The
horror franchise presents a similar obstacle. Franchises consist
of multiple installments featuring a similar, if not identical,
object. Oftentimes, the narrative of each successive work is
also similar. Given Carroll’s theory, audiences should find
continued installments uninteresting, given the dearth of
mystery with which to pique curiosity. Nonetheless, many
retain interest, engaging with each installment despite the lack
of significant variation.   
An additional, frequently critiqued aspect of Carroll’s theory is
that the source of pleasurable fear does not need to be
interstitial.[9] Construed as such, the genre of horror and
resulting pleasurable fear will apply only to works of art that
include a monster.[10] Critics have drawn attention to the fact
that this places problematic limitations on what constitutes
horror and, by extension, the phenomenon itself. Horror fans
“clearly expect monstrosity, though in quite what form is open
to question. The genre encompasses monsters present only
through suggestion or inference through to graphic portrayals
and the excesses of their depredations, while audience
reactions run the gamut... .”[11] Monsters need not be
revealed, nor necessarily be interstitial. Objects based in reality
are perfectly capable sources of pleasurable fear.[12] Norman
Bates is not an interstitial object. His actions and insanity are
monstrous, yet such individuals exist. The experience of
watching his actions throughout Psycho still produces both
fascination and fear. It is hard to distinguish how this differs
from the intrigue and disgust found in an interstitial object
such as Leatherface of Texas Chainsaw Massacre.[13]

Contemporary theorists sympathetic to Carroll have offered
alternative explanations that share the premise that the
pleasure of horror is not rooted in terror. Feminist film
philosopher Cynthia Freeland proposes that pleasure stems not
from fear or narrative curiosity but from intellectual intrigue
towards evil.[14] The concept of evil is disturbing, yet
compelling enough to arouse a desire for investigation. While
"Ellen" may consider Aliens a frightening film, she derives
pleasure from analyzing evil, which the narrative explores
through themes such as rape, corporate greed, prejudice, and
murder. While Freeland’s theory is structurally similar to
Carroll’s, it does not require the object to be interstitial, nor
does it discount that pleasurable fear can be found via
repeated engagements. However, it still encounters a similar
objection. Simply put, there are many instances in which
pleasurable fear is not the result of deep, detached, academic
meditation on an abstract concept. The audience at a midnight
slasher film, eager for the visceral thrill of watching the killer
enact horrors upon a victim, are unlikely dissecting thematic
intricacies. Instances of self-testing, where individuals engage
with horror simply to discern their capacity for tolerance, also
lack such a component.[15] While some approach horror
academically, claiming all fans of horror do so at all times is
problematic.
A further explanation posits that horror evokes pleasure by
reinforcing or reaffirming a status quo. Proponents of this
account interpret the object of horror as representing a threat
to predominantly held values, causing fear. When this deviant
object is defeated by the heroic protagonists, normalcy is
restored, creating comfort and security.[16] For instance, the
vampires of Stoker’s Dracula embody the unchecked libertine
sexuality and communicable foreign illnesses commonly feared
in eighteenth century England.[17] The creatures are
eventually defeated by members of proper society, triumphing
over the foreign and the repellent unknown, restoring
mainstream societal ideals. Again, fear is not the source of
pleasure, which instead stems from reaffirming social and
cultural identity. As with the previous arguments, this
explanation encounters a problem of scope. The argument
necessitates that works of horror reinforce a predominant
ideology. However, many works of horror serve to critique
social norms. It is also worth noting that, contrary to what the
argument implies, individuals who prescribe to supposedly
predominant ideologies will not necessarily find a horror
narrative enjoyable. Conversely, many who find such norms
disagreeable may count themselves horror fans. Additionally,
too many works of horror conclude with the object of horror
still present, if not triumphant. Texas Chainsaw Massacre
concludes with all but one of the protagonists murdered, while
the cannibalistic family responsible remains free to continue
butchering the innocent. According to the proposed theory,
such a work should give viewers less pleasure, if any, as the
predominant ideology is undermined. However, the work
remains a well-received staple of the genre.
Solutions based around the premise that pleasure lies external
to the sense of fear are problematic. The resulting explanation
will be too narrow in scope. At best, it may plausibly explain a
minority of specific occurrences. More importantly, these
solutions cannot overcome the notion that most individuals
drawn to horror want to be frightened, a position that
possesses intuitive appeal, alongside substantial supporting
evidence. The physiological symptoms that accompany
successfully engaging with horror, such as alertness, increased

heartbeat, muscle tension, and adrenaline, are not intrinsically
unpleasant.[18] Rather, positive or negative evaluation is
dependent on context. Furthermore, those who appreciate
horror self-report that these sensations are pleasurable. Fright
is a crucial component of the genre, so much so that a work
that fails to elicit sufficient fear will likely be deemed
unsuccessful. It is not uncommon for an audience member to
suggest he or she did not enjoy a work of horror because it
was not scary enough. If so much of horror’s success is judged
by its ability to evoke terror, does it not seem that audiences
are eager to be frightened?   
3. Feagin’s solution
In direct opposition to the previous theorists, Susan Feagin
proposes those who take pleasure in macabre works do so
because they enjoy a good scare. If this were not the case,
fear and disgust would be accidental to the narrative, while
common sense suggests they are not only central to such
fictions but also vital for their enjoyment. Fear is not a price
one is willing to pay for alternative complex cognitive rewards
but, rather, the source of pleasure.[19]
Feagin further asserts that the pleasures of horror derive from
meta-responses, second-order emotional reactions that stem
from analyzing one’s initial emotional response towards a work.
When engaging with horror, individuals often feel fear. If a
work provokes such reactions, it means the individual has the
capacity to respond appropriately to the stimulus.[20]
Recognizing this causes the individual to positively evaluate his
or her initial reaction. Conversely, if one believes taking
pleasure in horror is appropriate, then one positively evaluates
the pleasure, creating a second tier of enjoyment. The third
type of meta-response occurs when an individual recognizes
they have become psychologically flexible enough to enjoy
horror when they previously could not.[21]
There is significant inconsistency between Feagin’s initial claim
and subsequent emphasis on the explanatory power of metaresponses.[22] Feagin begins by arguing that fear is enjoyable
but abruptly shifts focus onto the role of meta-response. In two
of the cases Feagin describes, the pleasure is not due to the
sensations of fear. Rather, it is what the presence of fear
indicates about the individual. In her first meta-response,
pleasure results from positively evaluating one’s reaction of
disdain for terror. This does not require that one enjoys fear
but necessitates that one does not. The third meta-response
derives pleasure from becoming comfortable with the work.
Pleasurable responses only come from learning to overcome
distasteful feelings of fear. If, given Feagin’s initial premise,
fear itself is enjoyable, there would be no flexibility
involved.[23] We would simply enjoy the display, and the
second level evaluation would never come to pass. When
"James" decides to play an installment of the Silent Hill video
game series, he finds the artful use of graphics and sound
produce a terror that is enjoyable on a visceral, first-order
level.[24] He acts as Feagin first proposes, simply enjoying the
way the work makes him feel. He does not overcome any initial
distaste and thus never alters his psychological state.   
Perhaps Feagin is arguing that the horror consumer enjoys
both: sensations of fear alongside their second-order response.
This would be a dubious assumption regarding her first and
third meta-responses, as they require that fear be undesirable.
Nonetheless, it is presented as the second possible metaresponse. The individual engages with horror and enjoys the
fear brought forth. Upon reflection, he or she believes they

have reacted appropriately, arriving at a pleasurable secondorder evaluation. For Feagin’s characterization to be successful,
it would assume we categorize enjoyment of horror as
appropriate. However, this claim is frequently contested.
Works of horror necessarily encompass disturbing subject
matter including disgusting constructs, threatening acts, and
displays of violence. Many object to horror as entertainment
and argue against such media practices. Notably, the argument
from reactive attitudes is that consuming horror for pleasure
will gradually skew what one takes to be morally
repugnant.[25] Indulging to a sufficient degree will go so far as
to degrade one’s perspective on right and wrong.[26] Thus,
deriving pleasure from horror presents a threat to the
individual moral mindset.[27] Such arguments demonstrate
the controversial nature of Feagin's unsubstantiated
assumption and may cast aspersions on the viability of this
meta-response.
Feagin’s attempt to address the horror paradox occupies a
unique position. While others have argued that fear can be
pleasurable, Feagin is one of the few to combine this premise
alongside a meta-response explanation. Despite the unique
style of her approach, it has received comparably little
significant scholarly recognition or analysis since its publication
nearly a quarter-century ago. While Feagin’s use of metaresponse has been discussed at length, most have emphasized
only its capacity to address the paradox of tragedy. Given the
differences between the emotions of fear and sadness, such
discussions cannot adequately address the phenomenon of
pleasurable fear.
Admittedly, Feagin’s proposal is not without flaws. The
proposition that it is possible to enjoy fear promisingly
characterizes the horror experience. Yet, while Feagin claims to
embrace this premise, it is contradicted by her chosen metaresponses. For her solution, fear is instrumental to one's
experience of pleasure but not the source. It only serves as a
means of furthering self-awareness, producing self-satisfaction
that is a step removed from feelings of terror. Despite these
limitations, it would be unwise to simply dismiss the metaresponse structure in its entirety. If one were able to reconcile
Feagin’s initial premise of fear as pleasurable within a metatheoretical framework, the end result could present a
promising explanation of the horror paradox.
4. An alternative account
Through some minor modifications, it is, in fact, possible to
preserve the meta-response structure alongside the premise
that individuals enjoy fear. It is not, as Feagin proposes, that
pleasure is found in the second-order evaluation. This fails to
capture the horror experience so promisingly detailed in her
initial premise, that the enjoyment of being scared motivates
the appeal and willingness to engage with the genre. I propose
that, in contrast to Feagin's theory, the initial emotional state
is met with pleasure, while the second-order evaluation
produces apprehension.
An intriguing, overlooked facet of the individual is his or her
fascination with the macabre.[28] The macabre, while viewed
as disturbing or horrifying, nonetheless has an uniquely
intriguing appeal. The initial pleasure found in engaging with
disquieting art stems from a general, widely held sense of
fascination with the macabre. Monsters, death, and fright have
a hold over many, if not, to some extent, all individuals. This
causes a desire to encounter them in their fear-inducing

entirety. This is particularly true from the relative safety of
distance afforded us through the medium(s) of art and
fiction.[29] I suggest that macabre fascination ought to be
defined as follows: an intrinsic desire in the imaginative
exploration of the phenomenology of death, dying, or
preceding states of fright, pain, and suffering. Genuine
macabre fascination must contain these specific hallmarks. One
must be interested in the experience of the themes of mortality
and suffering. Furthermore, an individual's desire must be
intrinsic, rather than utilized as a means to attain some
further, extrinsic end, such as self-knowledge. This intrigue
drives individuals to seek out and explore the macabre themes
and subject matter so effectively conveyed within horror art.
The pleasure found in engaging with horror fiction stems from
indulging macabre fascination. A good horror narrative allows
those engaging in it to experience and explore fear, confront
depictions of death, face down nightmarish imaginings, and
engage with the foreboding unknown. The work in question
presents the engaging individual with an object that threatens
and arouses fear.[30] If successful, this piques macabre
fascination, making sensations of fear something that can be
enjoyed.[31] In this sense, it differs from instances in which
the fear felt is entirely negative and cannot be met with any
degree of pleasure, for instance, finding oneself at the mercy of
an actual masked serial killer. The successful work of horror
fulfills a desire and, in doing so, provides us with satisfaction
and pleasurable feelings. Assuming these or similar conditions
are met, the emotion of fear can be positively
valenced.[32],[33]
How, then, does a work of horror evoke further discomfort? It
is the very pleasure taken in watching the horrific displays that
presents unease. This disquiet stems from a second-order
evaluation of the morbid pleasure that occurs at the first-order
level. While morbid subject matter, such as death and
suffering, can be appealing, this enjoyment also produces
anxiety. Such attraction is a facet of character, but this does
not mean it is accepted without resistance. The macabre is not
typically seen as something in which one ought to take
pleasure. Exhibiting, if not possessing, such a trait is often met
with recrimination and is seen as improper. Should one assume
that emotions are morally evaluable, it follows that one ought
to respond to suffering with sympathy. If an individual were to
derive pleasure via the indulgence of his or her fascination with
the macabre by any means, including interaction with macabre
art or narrative, it would violate the appropriate moral valence
of how one ought to respond emotionally. Thus, it will count
against his or her moral character.[34] Someone might instead
adopt a more practical concern and worry that happily giving
over to the macabre could act as a sort of corrupting influence,
infiltrating the way he or she regards the world. Due to these
notions of impropriety, the pleasure felt when exploring the
macabre evokes a second-order meta-evaluation of
discomfort.
We cannot feel pleasure exclusively as a result of indulging in
macabre art but also a degree of disquiet towards the
depictions, creating the complex pleasurable fear. Should an
individual feel exclusively pleasure or fright, it will produce only
enjoyment or terror, respectively. If an individual were to do
so, they might be accused of not getting the work or engaging
in a manner distinct from its intended aim. If "Jamie" watches
Halloween and feels nothing but abject terror, a friend might
suggest she has overreacted. After all, it is an outlandish work
of fiction. Yet, if she responds to Michael Meyer’s horrific acts

of homicide with pure joy, with no trace of fear or discomfort,
said friend may fret over her moral or psychological character.
Enjoying horror requires push-and-pull between attraction and
repulsion. Darkly pleasurable, yet frighteningly improper,
oscillation is integral to its appeal. We are meant to enjoy a
work, yet ask ourselves, why do I enjoy this? Is it something I
ought to find entertaining? Engaging with horror as it is
intended necessitates such layers. The very pleasure taken in
the indulgence of macabre fascination and fear itself causes
discomfort. One enjoys the experience of horror, yet feels
reproach towards their pleasurable emotional state, creating
strong hedonic ambivalence.[35] Thus the experience remains
one of layered evaluations.     
Adopting this formulation of meta-response to horror has a
number of advantages. Perhaps most importantly, it preserves
the well-substantiated idea that the allure of horror stems from
the fact that fear can, in some circumstances, be enjoyable.
The appeal of this premise is made particularly salient when
juxtaposed against less intuitive solutions, such as those
proposed by Carroll and Freeland. Arguing that fear is
intrinsically negative requires accounting for the pleasure by
alternative means, resulting in the critiques previously
detailed. Assuming that one derives pleasure from
experiencing the macabre, it does not require narrative
disclosure be present. One can find an object of horror
morbidly fascinating and frightening, regardless. For instance,
"Nancy" might find Freddy Krueger horrifying and fascinating,
and enjoy said fascination, even if, or possibly because, she
already knows his properties will ensure a good scare.
Additionally, the proposed account does not require that
pleasurable fear be bound to the quality of being interstitial,
necessitate academic interest, or rely upon the complex and
debatable interpretations required to propose all objects of
horror must serve as a threat to mainstream values.  
5. Morality and macabre fascination
Assuming this proposal provides a compelling explanation
behind pleasurable fear and its bearing on the appeal of horror,
it brings out an additional question. Specifically, is it proper to
indulge our macabre fascination? The proposed solution relies
upon a complex ambivalence between enjoyment in indulging
morbid fascination and apprehension towards the fact that one
is taking pleasure in macabre depictions of monsters, death,
and suffering. From a moral perspective, this is typically
viewed as problematic. Is there not something unsettling about
the individual who enthusiastically describes, in detail, the
events of a horrific story on the news or finds themselves
rubbernecking at the site of a ghastly automobile accident?
Clearly, the macabre carries with it some measure of
recrimination. This raises the questions, what is the moral
status of macabre fascination, and when, if ever, ought we
allow ourselves to indulge?
I propose that indulging is acceptable, if not suggested, as
engaging with the macabre proves beneficial to developing
important traits. Although this may appear unintuitive, it can
be clarified through a helpful thought experiment. Picture a
hypothetical individual completely devoid of all traces of
macabre fascination. How would such a person behave?
Assuming this individual genuinely possessed no fascination
with the macabre, he or she would possess a variety of
damaging character flaws. The absence of macabre fascination
would make this person foreign to important aspects of
humanity and, ultimately, unable to pursue an array of projects
necessary for a healthy character.[36] With regards to

personality, one could surmise he or she would be painfully
naïve, if not largely ignorant of reality. It is also probable that
they would possess an indefatigable sense of cheeriness. Such
exaggerated naiveté and optimism would likely make for an
individual most would find intolerable, hindering an ability to
develop meaningful relationships. Such intense degrees of
unceasing optimism would bring forth additional shortcomings,
as research suggests that excessive degrees of happiness can
lead to undesirable outcomes in healthy populations, alongside
psychological dysfunction, for instance, increased risk-taking
behavior, excessively rigid demeanors, and a general lack of
sensitivity towards others.[37]  
Engaging with the macabre and monstrous also serves an
important adaptive advantage. Horror has the ability to
influence and modify somatic markers in the brain, allowing
one to better understand, develop, and train emotional
responses.[38] As such, a desire to engage with manifestations
of our fears ought not be denied. Used responsibly,
imaginatively confronting what we fear or do not understand
can have significant positive utility. It becomes possible to
develop stronger intellectual and emotional understanding of
just what our fears entail. Conversely, the utter lack of
willingness or ability to engage with horror will serve a
disutility, as such adaptations could remain underdeveloped. If
this hypothetical individual was somehow forced to encounter
or endure anything macabre, they would react poorly. We learn
through exploration that morbid occurrences are, to an extent,
natural. In doing so, it becomes possible to learn how they can
be accepted, dealt with, or overcome.[39] Given their refusal
to see the darker side of events and emotions, it is unlikely
that this individual would be able to attain such a mature
perception.
Opponents might argue that these engagements weaken the
capacity for sympathy. At best, it creates a sense of
detachment. At worst, viewing the macabre as a source of
entertainment may cause one to regard real-world atrocities as
amusing. Given such outcomes, it would be better to avoid
indulging altogether. It would be a mistake to accept such a
perspective, as complete lack of desensitization has a marked
flaw. Namely, it would leave one at the mercy of many
uncontrollable, often extreme reactive attitudes. Evan Kreider
objects that, without any desensitization, individuals would, in
actuality, be overly sensitive to all things.[40] Reactive
attitudes, while vital to moral health and composure, are
unavoidably tempered over time. However, this does not make
an individual immoral. In actuality, it allows the individual to
cope with the surrounding world. Without tempering,
individuals would behave as the emotional equivalent of an
exposed nerve. We have no reason to think an individual
devoid of the capacity to engage with the macabre would
behave differently.
It is also significant to note that this individual would likely be
intensely unimaginative. The use of imagination may at times
require taking up a different viewpoint, construing events in
such a way as to deviate from what is typically viewed as
emotionally proper. Our hypothetical individual would be
unable to take up such perspectives, as he or she would have
to possess absolute correlation between emotional propriety
and imagination. The ramifications of this flaw are more severe
than they may at first appear. It would bring with it an inability
to take on any alternative viewpoints, assuming said views
contained even the slightest trace of supposedly improper
emotional responses. For the purposes of argument, this would

mean all viewpoints that require an appreciation of anything
that partakes in the macabre. This lack of perspective would
give rise to intense narrow-mindedness. Perhaps most
important to moral action, knowledge of these aspects and
their influence on the individual can provide us with knowledge,
not only of our feelings, but those of others.[41] As such, it
teaches us how to sympathize with and aid our fellows in their
dealings with the macabre.
Someone curious about death who chose to explore this
intrigue could come to possess a well-adjusted viewpoint on its
nature, become better prepared to understand the various
ways as to how or why it causes others worry, and help,
accordingly. One who does not possess such a capacity for
adopting other perspectives would be much less capable. It is
unlikely that he or she would have the ability to fully grasp the
diverse effects of pain or loss, especially in those who
comprehend or approach death differently. Such failures could
feasibly extend to other instances where empathy requires
adopting a macabre mindset. Assuming a person could not
wholly comprehend how others react to pain, could they
capably ease their ill child? Could they effectively discuss selfdestructive behavior, bullying, or even nightmares? Performing
such actions necessarily involves being able to comprehend
and engage with topics categorized as macabre.    
6. Conclusion
Our interactions with aesthetic representations of the macabre
are complex, marked by interwoven fear and pleasure,
enjoyment and apprehension. Many find such morbid
representations pleasurable, yet simultaneously regard them
with a measure of anxiety and discomfort, much as we do their
real-world counterparts. Prior attempts to address this
phenomenon via avenues such as Carroll and Freeland’s
cognitivism and Feagin’s meta-theory have demonstrated
varying measures of promise. However, they have also been
met with damaging critiques. Such objections may, to some
extent, be bypassed via the proposed restructured metatheory, which maintains that fear can be enjoyed, while
simultaneously avoiding the contradictions that plague Feagin’s
account. If the proposed solution holds, it requires further
investigation into the moral status of morbid fascination. We
must necessarily refine what constitutes macabre and how it is
to be differentiated from similar responses, such as disgust.
Furthermore, while indulgence in the macabre may be
acceptable, there must be limitations. Exploring one’s
fascination with the macabre through art within the genre of
horror is arguably commonplace and more likely beneficial.[42]
Indulging this fascination through actual acts on others is more
likely morally problematic. Failure to establish such a boundary
clearly presents a slippery slope. For instance, it could allow for
extreme, potentially dangerous acts of investigation into the
macabre in the name of desire satisfaction. However, the
alternative meta-theory may serve as a solid foundation on
which to formulate an account of these intriguing aesthetic
phenomena.[43]  
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